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Abstract 
The security strategy adopted by the European Council in late 2003 underlines the importance of conflict 
prevention and civil, but also – wherever necessary – military intervention in weak or failing states. The 
new European Security Strategy (ESS) recommends that foreign and security policy should more closely 
dovetail with development policy. In view of the fact, that development cooperation (DC) has specific 
operational experiences, particularly in relation to weak states, development policy needs to assume a 
proactive stance towards the ESS. In order to become an important player in European security policy, 
Development policy needs to confront the task of aggregating its large operational experiences into stra-
tegic concepts on how development policy can contribute explicitly in erasing the socioeconomic founda-
tions of the existing transnational threats to European security. Furthermore, development policy's aim of 
providing significant contributions to Europe's new security policy calls implicitly for huge efforts in 
personnel, conceptual, and financial terms. This in turn must be predicated on new forms of division be-
tween bilateral, European, and multilateral development policy. 
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1 Introduction 
In December 2003 the European Union formulated a common security policy based on a draft presented 
by the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana. Despite 
a number of setbacks experienced in the process of developing a common foreign and security policy, 
viewed in conceptual terms, the strategy finally adopted should be interpreted as a qualitative advance. 
While the CFSP continues to be one of the EU's intergovernmental pillars with marked coherence prob-
lems, the European Security Strategy (ESS), which identifies security threats as well as strategic re-
sponses to those threats, is an important contribution to a more coherent and thus more effective imple-
mentation of European foreign, security, and development policy.1 Against the background of this recent 
development, this paper will discuss the emerging integration of European foreign, security, and devel-
opment policy. The paper proceeds in three steps: The following section will start out with a brief 
summary of the ESS’ key arguments and hereafter place some of the security strategy paper's most impor-
tant propositions in the overall context of the future articulation of Europe's external relations. In a second 
step we will analyze, from the perspective of development policy, the challenges that will emerge in con-
nection with a closer dovetailing of security and development policy. This section on the one hand out-
lines arguments in favor of a more proactive involvement of development policy in European security 
policy. On the other hand, we also highlight the need for development policy to craft strategically ori-
ented concepts from its large operational experiences, if it is to play a more strategic role in European 
security policy. Building on these arguments, we will then, in a third step, tackle the organizational chal-
lenges for development cooperation (DC), which have resulted from its increasing involvement in secu-
rity issues. In this context, we present a strategic diagram containing some possible scenarios facing a 
future European development policy in the context of the new framework of Europe´s external relations. 
2 Content and Characteristics of the European Security Strategy 
The ESS defines three principal security threats for the European Union (EU).2 First, an extremely vio-
lence-prone, transnationally networked terrorism that is for the most part motivated by religious funda-
mentalism has set its sights on Europe and is seeking to expand its base of operations. Second, the securi-
ty threat caused by the (potential) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that could lead 
both to new arms races in regions of strategic relevance to Europe and to a combination of WMD prolife-
ration and terrorism. Third, the threat stemming from the failure and erosion of state systems in many of 
the world’s regions because state erosion provides the space for organized international crime such as 
trafficking in humans, drugs, and arms as well as for organizing terrorist activities. The ESS concludes 
that all of those security threats facing Europe are of an increasingly global nature, a fact, which has in-
duced the EU to define the field of its own security interests in global terms. As a consequence, the EU 
has no choice but to assume the role of a global security actor and to gear its worldwide strategic respon-
ses to these threats. Against the background of this scenario, the ESS derives some essential strategic 
thrusts of a global European security policy. 
First, it is noted, that the EU needs to expand the security belt around Europe, since the process of globa-
lization and the ongoing EU enlargement is diminishing the geographic distance between the EU and the 
most sensitive areas for European security such as the Near and Middle East and the Caucasus region. 
Particular importance is given to the need for extensive cooperation with the EU’s new member states and 
their neighbors in eastern and southeastern Europe. Furthermore, importance is given to the need for en-
                                                     
1 For recent discussions on the ESS see for example Dumoulin et al 2004, Flechtner 2003, for an overview on the develop-
ment respectively the Challenges of a common European Security policy see the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on 
Europe’s Security Capabilities. 
2 The ESS can be obtained from: http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=391&lang=EN. 
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gaging more intensively with Mediterranean states and for providing cooperative contributions for solv-
ing the Israeli-Arab conflict. 
Second, in view of the new transnational security threats, the EU will have to step up its efforts to help 
forge an effective multilateral world order. According to the ESS, only by strengthening both internatio-
nal organizations and a global security regime compatible with the norms of the UN Charter, can the in-
ternational community create an international framework capable of mitigating the risks outlined above. 
Third, the EU needs to further develop its capacities to take enhanced action against transnational terro-
rism, international crime and the proliferation of WMD. Furthermore, the EU needs to augment its at-
tempts to prevent state failure respectively to reduce the scope of ensuing crises. In this context, the EU 
needs to orient its military capacities to the described threats. However, the ESS makes clear, that these 
security threats of the 21st century cannot be addressed by purely military means. The EU must have at its 
disposal a mix of instruments consisting of civil and military measures. 
The ESS’ Characteristics 
By placing the ESS in the overall context of Europe's external relations, its limitation to security policy is 
obvious. The concept is marked by a concentration of EU external relations to the goal system of security. 
It therefore covers only one, albeit a central, dimension of Europe's external relations, while largely turn-
ing a blind eye to other important challenges such as the management of world economic interdependen-
cies or technological-scientific cooperation aimed at strengthening the EU's competitiveness. Thus, in-
stead of being a project designed to shape the EU's multifarious external relations, or a thematically broa-
dened EU foreign policy enabling the Union to play a greater hand in shaping global governance, the 
strategy concept is largely restricted to security policy. At the same time, the security strategy is not ori-
ented to a traditional security concept defined by a system of strictly territorial states with differentiating 
military potentials. Rather, the strategy is based on a concept of “extended security”. Viewed from this 
perspective, insecurity and escalating violence may be rooted in complex economic, power-related, socio-
cultural, and/or environmental factors. Javier Solana, for example has noted: 
“Many Regions – especially Africa – are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity, and poverty. Regio-
nal conflicts fuel the demand for proliferation. Violent religious extremism is linked to the pressure of 
modernization, and to the alienation of young people in societies, which are experiencing social, cul-
tural and political crisis“.3 
Accordingly, sustainable security policy is not only a matter of military capacities but is based on the 
ability to use, at the earliest possible point, a combination of civil and military instruments to defuse both 
political and socioeconomic crises before they turn violent. This combination thus implies the use of a 
broad range of development-, foreign-, economic-, and environmental-policy instruments and the classic 
security-policy set consisting of police cooperation, intelligence cooperation, and, in the extreme case, 
military intervention. Consequently, the ESS calls for a closer dovetailing of various instruments from the 
different fields of EU’s external relations as well as for efforts to gear them to the goals of security policy. 
Beyond the vision of “extended security”, the ESS has a European “bias”, when compared to the US Na-
tional Security Strategy of September 2002. While there are important areas in which both, the ESS and 
the US Security Strategy overlap, both concepts arrive (in part) at different conclusions. The specifically 
European profile is manifest in three aspects: first, in the emphasis with which the European security 
strategy calls for efforts to strengthen a multilateral world order and international law; second, in the em-
phasis placed on conflict prevention and civil cooperation, i.e. in a long-term perspective keyed to pre-
venting state failure; finally, in efforts to embed political pressure and the use of robust military interven-
tion in the framework of the international legal order.4 
                                                     
3 Statement by Javier Solana at the National Forum on Europe, Dublin Castle, 8 January 2004. 
4 See Solana (2004). 
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From this perspective, as far as the Transatlantic relationship is concerned, the European profile could 
facilitate a division of labor with the US on security policy. Scarce material resources available to restruc-
ture European military potentials as well as enormous differences as regards the direction and the pace of 
the European integration process in the military sector, a Transatlantic division of labor could possible be 
emerging: with its relatively modest military capacities, the EU, acting in the capacity of a cooperative 
world power, could seek to focus its efforts in the fields of prevention, conflict resolution, and stabiliza-
tion of fragile states. In matters bound up with the military dimensions of security policy – going beyond 
highly limited missions like the present one in Montenegro – the EU would remain the US' “junior part-
ner”. As such, the US as the only military power with a global intervention radius, is practically predes-
tined in the medium term to conduct robust military missions. However, the apparent inability of US for-
eign and security policy to win the peace in Iraq and to contribute effectively to Iraq's political and socio-
economic development, could lead the US to develop a more marked willingness to accept the EU's “soft-
power capacities and experiences”. 
Such a scenario implies that the EU – possibly in cooperation with the United States – should undertake 
concerted efforts to further develop the multilateral legal framework with respect to “humanitarian inter-
vention” and deployment of military forces to protect international security. At the same time, while in-
creasing responsiveness to the altered security threats in an era of transnational terrorism, organized crime 
and failing states, the EU should simultaneously embed such endeavors in the multilateral institutions set 
out for example in the UN Charter and the UN Security Council's “monopoly on power”. As such, mili-
tary interventions may well be necessary to contain violence, but they must be clearly based on interna-
tional rules, principles, procedures, and legal institutions. An “eye-level” transatlantic partnership with 
the US, which would have to be developed on the basis of a European security concept, would have pros-
pects of success only if the EU were to actually and comprehensively assume its responsibility in conflict 
resolution as well as in efforts to strengthen weak states and considerably enlarge its engagement in this 
area. Development policy would have to play an important role in this context. Otherwise, as Robert 
Cooper – Director of the EU's Directorate “General External Economic Relations and Common Foreign 
Figure 1: Extended security concept 
 
Source: Hippler (2003, 300) 
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Policy” – put it: “If it is not possible for deeds to follow on words, then words are meaningless, indeed 
sometimes even irresponsible” (Cooper 2003, 39). 
3 Dovetailing security and development policy: evidence, chances, and risks 
The increasing links between development and security policy 
There are good reasons why the EU's strategy concept links the agendas of development policy and secu-
rity policy. On the one hand, it is obvious that there can be no development without peace and domestic 
security. As development in Afghanistan, southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Pa-
lestine among other have drastically made clear, investments in development programs are practically 
unable to unfold their impacts as long as civil war, organized crime, international drug-trafficking, or 
warlords are undermining a societies political stability. Of the world's 60 poorest countries, roughly half 
are beset by acute or latent armed conflicts and about 20 % of Africa's population is living in zones of 
acute and violent conflict. In such contexts, development policy can achieve its effects only if its efforts 
are flanked by measures designed to increase these countries' political stability and security. Without  
peaceful coexistence in societies embedded in a framework of liberal state structures, the probable sce-
nario for these countries is very likely to be one of either despotism or civil war, both being clearly un-
conducive to socioeconomic development. 
Yet the relationship between development and security may just as well be viewed the other way around. 
In the long run international security is not to be had without development. In a growingly borderless 
world, fragile states and crumbling societies are bound to pose transnational security threats: like those in 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Congo, Somalia, or Colombia, with their socioeconomic development blocked by the 
given political conditions. From such a perspective, impoverishment processes, ecological degradation, 
moribund education systems together with weak state institutions, corruption, and political exclusion 
generate the well-known and explosive socio-economic mixture consisting of organized crime, religious 
and/or ethnic extremism, widespread hopelessness and political violence. In the extreme case, these  
developments result in serious state erosion and civil war, conditions, which are the seedbeds of transna-
tional terrorism, international organized crime, and WMD proliferation. 
These interdependencies between security and development are the reason why it is imperative to forge a 
new alliance between development policy and security policy in such existing or potential “zones of  
disorder”. For traditional security policy and development policy, the growing interfaces of both policy 
arenas have strategic consequences that are at least partially reflected in the ESS. First, there are moral 
reasons for according more attention to the nexus of security and development in the process of shaping 
Europe's foreign relations. A critical public sphere to heed these moral “obligations” is furthermore call-
ing on politics: i.e. public opinion in Europe is also exerting pressure for a closer intertwinement of secu-
rity policy with development policy. Second, an enlightened self-interest calls for a coupling of security 
policy and development policy. If globalization is increasingly affecting barriers to development in geo-
graphically distant parts of the world, then the obvious response – or indeed necessity, when Europe's 
immediate “neighborhood” is concerned – would be to more closely interlink development policy with 
security policy. If Europe's aim is in fact a world order defined by international law and underpinned by 
security policy, what we need is a development policy that encourages partner-country’s acceptance of 
liberal standards of national and international “good” governance. 
Taking the close interrelationship between security policy and development policy seriously and recogniz-
ing the crucial influence of participatory and accountable governance on economic and international  
cooperation, this would be to raise the promotion of democratic regimes to the level of a guideline not 
only from a development but also from a security perspective. Thus, the EU’s security policy has to as-
sume the stance of an explicit promoter of liberal state structures if it is in fact to tackle the root causes of 
the current security threats. This would mean adjusting Europe's security policy to an existing, central 
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thrust of development policy. Yet, these conclusions, which are consonant with the logic of the ESS, have 
not yet reached the mainstream of foreign policy makers and researchers as is demonstrated by continu-
ous calls for a classic stability policy that acquiesces in authoritarian rule as a response to political turmoil 
and civil war. 
Against the background of the trends outlined above, how is development policy to position itself vis-à-
vis an ESS that is gradually winning contours of its own? Despite the increasing links between develop-
ment and security policy, one can observe a high degree of uncertainty in the (European) development-
cooperation community. On the one hand, DC actors cannot close their eyes to the increasing overlap 
between development policy and security policy. But on the other hand these overlaps are bound up with 
three latent and closely interrelated fears in large parts of the DC community: 
1) The first consists in the fear that resources within the DC portfolio could be extensively reallocated in 
favor of investments of particular relevance to security policy. A close dovetailing of development 
policy and security policy could, from this perspective, lead to a re-channelling of funds from devel-
oping countries or regions with less relevance to security policy to “risk countries”, or from “classic” 
fields of development policy (e.g. basic education, resource protection) to sectors more relevant to se-
curity policy (e.g. support for police and military). 
2) The second fear is that the security imperative anchored in Europe's foreign relations might alter the 
goal system of development policy and therefore undermines other central issue areas of development 
cooperation. While development cooperation is in fact in a position to provide contributions to inter-
national security policy by helping to stabilize fragile societies, as well as by promoting democracy 
and good governance, it does have other, “autonomous” goals of its own. These goals like those of 
the Rio-Agenda and the Millennium Development Goals cannot be reduced to immediate “contribu-
tions” to security policy. Thus, the ESS might easily awaken the impression that development policy 
could be “incorporated” within the EU's complex security conception. 
3) The third fear is bound up with the concern that Europe's foreign and security policy could coopt 
development policy. The latter, it is feared, could gradually lose its autonomy as a policy field and be 
instrumentalized by foreign and security policy, without gaining in return any possibilities to take  
a hand in shaping the course of world events. Development policy could become the handmaiden of 
foreign and security policy, and be nudged out of any involvement in decisions taken at the interfaces 
between development cooperation and security policy. 
These fears that funds may be (re-) allocated at the expense of “traditional issues” of development policy; 
that the goal coordinates of development policy are to be altered, and that development policy may be co-
opted by a future European security policy are not unjustified. Some observers have in this connection 
rightly pointed to the years of the Cold War, when development policy was all too often forced to take the 
back seat to the interests of security policy. At the same time, it is obvious that a strategy of seeking to 
evade the interdependencies between foreign, security, and development policy , and instead falling, as it 
were, passively back on old, “traditional” fields, is rather unlikely to meet with success. Instead, develop-
ment policy is more likely to lose a measure of its significance if it declines to become involved in these 
strategy debates. In view of the – in our opinion – largely pertinent risk analysis provided by the ESS, 
development policy should adopt a proactive strategy that self-assuredly includes the comparative 
strengths of DC. 
The ESS’ Blindspots and the Obligations of Development Cooperation 
Any proactive positioning of development cooperation that places more emphasis on the opportunities 
than the risks is not only legitimized – vis-à-vis other policy fields – by development policy's own inter-
ests. Rather, development policy derives its legitimacy from the fact of being the policy field in posses-
sion of the greatest trove of experience in conflict prevention, stabilization of weak societies, and civil 
activities in post-conflict situations. In view of its operational capacities, development policy can there-
fore be said to be relatively well equipped to help resolve complex security problems, consisting of trans-
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national interdependencies, privatized violence, and unstable state structures. This strength could com-
pensate for the limits and weaknesses of traditional foreign and security policy. In this context, even the 
innovative ESS with its orientation to the concept of “extended security”, displays two blind spots typical 
of classic foreign and security policy: 
1) First, the ESS security strategy, like most other originally foreign-policy contributions to the “new 
security policy”, beyond broad strategic thrusts offers little on how to deal with the complexity of the 
links between socioeconomic development on the one hand and government instability, terrorism, and 
organized crime on the other. Foreign policy generally has even less to offer when it comes to concrete 
knowledge concerning the best operational approaches to preventing state erosion and state failure 
and supporting the development of viable and more or less liberal government structures. The process 
character that is typically at work in development cooperation programs, for instance when support-
ing poverty reduction, the provision of basic social services, and “good” governance is for the most 
part given insufficient attention in other policy fields. Consequently the latter often do not have the 
long-term perspective needed to eliminate the breeding grounds for terrorism, organized and the pro-
liferation of WMD. However, it is precisely this process character that one has to focus on if the new 
security threats are to be combated effectively. Development policy in this field of activity can fall 
back on decades of operational experience, is typified by a high level of realism concerning the pit-
falls involved, and is mindful of the time dimension required for cooperation with weak states. 
2) The second blind spot of the ESS consists of a failure to reflect adequately on the interests of poten-
tial partners outside the OECD. The ESS is, in essence, Eurocentric. Apart from the threats posed by 
failing states, transnational terror, and proliferation of WMD, it is also essential to more clearly per-
ceive concerns about the basic foundations of “human security” in the developing world, if the pro-
claimed intention to promote the development of a global security architecture is in fact to be taken 
seriously. Most of the violence experienced in the world since the 1990s was due not to the transna-
tional terrorism that rudely awakened the OECD countries from their dream of a peaceful “end of his-
tory”. Instead, what has been causing most human disaster have been the proceedings in Chechnya, 
Palestine, Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, Colombia and other zones of permanent violence. Only after the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001, have these zones received substantial attention, however primari-
ly because of their implicit security threat for Europe and not so much because of the implicit politi-
cal and economic causes of these violent conflicts. Again in the ESS, these causes find little attention 
and therefore, the endogenous interests of developing countries as the natural partners for combating 
the new security threats, have been systematically ignored. If that, the ESS would have paid more, 
and more serious, attention to the Millennium Goals, the Doha Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus 
and the Johannesburg Process. Should attempts fail to achieve effective progress toward a “fair glob-
alization”, the outcome is likely to be problems in the security cooperation between Europe and po-
tential partners in the non-OECD world and instabilities in the global system. Perceiving global risks 
only in terms of factors which immediately affect the security of the OECD and being indifferent to-
wards the problem complexes threatening the human, political, and economic security of poorer re-
gions is problematic in conceptual terms; for it is in the zones of disorder that the root socioeconomic 
causes of the new security risks are bred. 
European development policy is thus going to have to make up for some lost ground. Using its rich stock 
of experience in precisely those fields where “classic” foreign policy has relatively little to say, develop-
ment policy must profile itself as a strategic partner. Yet development policy itself is still far from being 
in a position to offer any magic formulas to counter state failure and the spiraling of developing countries 
into civil war and social disintegration. Development policy sees itself faced with the challenge of mar-
shaling its conceptual and operational knowledge in the field, translating it into manageable, country-
specific strategies, and explaining to outside actors the viability and effectiveness of its own set of in-
struments. What is needed most of all is a strategy along the lines of the Solana model for the 25-30 frag-
ile states in the world. Which of them are of priority for European development policy? What systematic 
lessons can be learnt from the experience in the Balkans, East Timor or even Central America? Are estab-
lished monitoring processes adequate for the surveillance of crisis countries? How should the EU member 
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states’ approaches to crisis prevention be coordinated? What will an effective strategy for stabilising 
weak states cost? To cope with these challenges effectively, development policy can build on three com-
parative strengths: 
1) Since the 1990s, development policy has been involved intensively with the various facets of promot-
ing “good” governance, the ultimate key to eliminating the causes of new security threats. The ESS’ 
stated goal of eliminating the long-term threats posed by weak states can be achieved only by 
strengthening liberal government structures in the respective countries. For gains in stability made by 
arbitrary, despotic rule seldom have a future, and all too often they tend to increase social polariza-
tion, block development, give rise to political resistance, and thus to new security risks in the medium 
term. No other policy field has looked so intensively into the potentials and the limitations involved 
in efforts to promote good governance and nation-building based on liberal principles. 
2) Good background knowledge of socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, and politico-economic interdepen-
dencies as well as operational experience in the relevant countries is absolutely essential to providing 
both development-oriented and security-relevant support in the cases of failing states or crises pre-
vention. Beyond their experience in the field of good governance, development-policy actors are e-
quipped with this comparative advantage of country-specific expertise. This expertise is needed to 
link humanitarian aid, efforts to (re)build government structures, poverty reduction, and economic 
development strategies in such a way as to provide solid contributions to a sustainable security policy. 
3) Finally, development-policy actors are the “natural-born” brokers to mediate between the interests of 
the EU and developing countries. This implies that development-policy actors are in a position both 
to represent European security interests and to assume the role of the actors of Europe's external rela-
tions that are most familiar with the legitimate interests of the developing countries and best able to 
factor these interests into their activities. 
These described comparative advantages result in a number of criteria that may provide an initial strategic 
mapping for security-relevant development cooperation (table). These criteria will have to be supplement-
ed with operational and country-specific and therefore, context-dependent measures. 
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Table 1: Contributions of development policy to stabilizing countries affected by crisis and conflict 
 Crisis prevention Acute crisis Post-crisis intervention 
Partner characteristics Erosion of the state's monopoly of power, 
increase in politically motivated violence 
Civil war, absence of the 
state`s power monopoly 
Approval of cease-fire or after successful 
military intervention 
Characteristics of DC Broker function between partner country 
and EU security policy 
Packages of tailor-made measures aiming 
at the specific conditions/causes of crisis 
(e.g. distribution conflicts – environmental 
crisis– growing economy of violence – 
conflicts among elites) in partner countries 
Long-term in nature, adapted to partner 
absorption capacity 
Moderation between conflict parties 
The need to fuse good governance, contri-
butions to socioeconomic development, 
and security-oriented DC 
Security-oriented DC plus 
development-oriented 
emergency aid 
Civil contributions to 
peace missions 
Short-term and flexible 
approaches 
Broker function between partner countries 
and EU security policy 
Establishment of security as primary point 
of reference 
Long-term in nature, adapted to partner 
absorption capacity 
Visible signs of reconstruction (schools, 
hospitals), building of material infrastruc-
ture plus capacity-building 
Good governance, fusion of contributions to 
socioeconomic development and security-
oriented DC 
Objectives Deescalation, conflict resolution, stabiliza-
tion, good governance 
Safeguarding the fulfil-
ment of basic individual 
needs, political stabiliza-
tion, conflict transforma-
tion 
Support for security, state-building, socio-
economic development, good governance 
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If development policy succeeds in formulating, from this rich trove of know-how, a properly defined set 
of best practices designed to deal effectively with the relevant security-related issues, it will be able to 
position itself as a strategically relevant actor in the context of the Solana strategy. A proactive orientation 
of this kind is not only likely to prove to be the best way to avoid any cooptation of foreign and security 
policy. It is at the same time apt to be the key condition needed by development policy to make clear that 
it is responsible too for other significant and resource-intensive issues (like sustainable development, 
poverty reduction) which go beyond the agenda of security relevant development policies. Or to put it 
differently: if development policy fails to assert its interests proactively in the ongoing process, it may 
well find itself up against a set of instruments and modes of resource allocation that are dictated by other 
actors. 
One of the most challenging problems, that European DC has to tackle effectively, when attempting to 
reach the above mentioned goal, are the institutional blockades to policy coherency. Furthermore, an ef-
fective security policy containing a strong preventive component is very costly, long-term in nature, in-
tensive in terms of coordination, and unlikely always to be crowned with success. In a contribution to 
European security policy, development policy is thus called upon to point unmistakably to these factors as 
well. For example, the proposal drafted in September 2004 by the Barcelona Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities points at the heart of the debate. It recommends that a “Human Security Response 
Force” (comprising around 5,000 civilians) should be created in addition to the planned EU military 
force. This would need to be a force of highly trained, rapidly deployable specialists (development and 
humanitarian aid experts, administrators, human rights monitors, police). It should not have to struggle 
with internal language barriers. Its members should undergo regular training together so that a sense of 
“corporate identity” is formed and operational routines become standard. Such a civilian EU intervention 
force needs to learn to cooperate with other foreign and security policy actors including the military  to 
prepare for the challenge of coordinating foreign, security and development action in the case of crisis. 
By creating such a force, the EU would acquire the human resource capacity needed to translate the con-
cept of “extended security” into action. 
In view of the bottleneck and risk factors involved, European development policy is therefore going to 
have to deal with two central challenges. First, in its dealings with other policy fields development policy 
is going to be increasingly forced to deal with growing allocation conflicts for scarce resources and to 
defend itself in disputes concerning the areas for which it is concretely responsible. If it is to successfully 
accept this challenge, European development policy is, second, going to have to overcome the multiplici-
ty of coherence problems with which it is beset. The fragmentation or disintegration of European DC is 
the most effective barrier to a coherent and strategic orientation of this policy field at the European level. 
It is not only that at the Commission level, at least three commissioners (development cooperation, trade, 
foreign relations) are responsible for development-related tasks. The situation is even more complex by 
the appearance of another influential actor, the High Representative for the CFSP. Furthermore, at present 
it also continues to be unclear whether and to what extent the role and the competences of a future EU 
foreign minister will serve to reduce the scope of these coherence problems, or indeed to render them all 
the more complicated. Apart from the institutional blockades at the EU level, there is also a need for co-
ordination processes between the national ministries and implementing agencies involved in the technical 
and financial cooperation provided by member states, an effort which would boost the aim of a common 
European development policy. Last, the creation of a coherent European development policy is at times 
obstructed by the great number of autonomous and semi-autonomous actors engaged in the field of proj-
ect planning and implementation. A heightened awareness of the chances and risks associated with a 
closer intertwinement of security policy and development policy for European development policy might 
prove to be a selective incentive to get on with the institutional reforms urgently required to boost coher-
ence. 
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4 The organizational consequences of the ESS for European DC – Three 
Scenarios 
“By far the hardest challenge facing the world community today is to keep long-term goals in mind in 
the face of urgent and bitter divisions over Iraq and the war on terrorism. The problems of Aids, po-
verty and environmental degradation will not wait for a new consensus on Iraq or the Middle East.“5 
On the basis of the arguments advanced above, however, European development policy will be unable to 
position itself successfully and proactively in the field of security unless it seeks organizational reform. 
Its contribution to European security policy cannot simply be added as a new bullet point in the to-do list 
of European DC. Such an approach would contribute to a further organizational and conceptual fragmen-
tation of DC, the structure of the European DC needs an organizational reform with an eye to the emerg-
ing new field of activity. In Europe, foreign, security, and development policy are all in the midst of a 
profound process of transformation where interdependencies between these three policy fields are becom-
ing more and more manifest. As far as development policy is concerned, considerable creative power will 
therefore be needed to reshape this policy field in such a way as to safeguard its autonomy and relevance, 
without losing sight of the interdependencies involved in Europe's external relations. This creative power 
will see itself confronted with manifest distribution conflicts between major international development 
projects that, while linked, still compete with one another. 
Since the 1990s, and despite stagnating investments in international development cooperation, develop-
ment policy has continued to enlarge its agenda. The HIPC initiatives, the PRSP process, the MDGs, the 
Rio agenda, and development policy's efforts to help shape the course of globalization characterize the 
growingly comprehensive challenges that development policy must meet. The linkage between develop-
ment policy and security policy, which is a core element of the ESS, adds another resource-intensive and 
highly complex field of activity. An attempt to aggregate this thematic diversity leads to three megaproj-
ects of international development policy: 
• the MDG poverty-reduction agenda 
• the security agenda 
• the Rio agenda, with its focus on global challenges. 
There is no doubt that each of these three megaprojects is of great significance for international politics, 
and there are major interrelationships between poverty reduction, security, and other trans-boundary glob-
al problems. But the actors concretely involved in these projects should be aware that in a world of scarce 
resources there are also tensions between projects of this scale. These tensions and conflict potentials are 
bound up with the allocation and deployment of monetary resources; the weighting assigned to the me-
gaprojects; divergent partner countries views concerning these projects; and different roles played in these 
projects by other externally oriented ministries and government agencies outside development policy. 
Poverty Reduction and the MDG agenda: This is the classic playing field of development policy. UNDP's 
Human Development Report 2003 outlines the “roadmap” for an MDG-oriented development policy con-
centrated in essence on halving absolute poverty, eradicating poverty-linked diseases, and ensuring access 
to basic education for all by the year 2015. Viewed from this perspective, development policy should be 
targeted on the world's 60 poorest countries, which are unable to reach the Millennium Goals on their 
own. Among these countries are some 20 that are torn by war and violence. However, viewed from the 
perspective of the MDGs, development programs in Peru, Honduras, Kenya, and Bangladesh are just as 
important as development programs in Afghanistan or Iraq, even though the former countries pose no or 
only limited international security risks. Although the fact that poverty reduction also contributes to more 
security and stability in partner countries, may be seen as a positive externality, this is not a goal per se. 
Accordingly, poverty-reduction strategies consonant with the MDG logic cannot be concentrated one-
                                                     
5 Jeffrey Sachs, Financial Times, 14 October 2003. 
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sidedly on countries, which pose security threats to the industrialized countries. They must focus on the 
societies weakest in socioeconomic terms. If we follow the calculations presented by Jeffery Sachs' Mil-
lennium Development Project, the donor countries would have to roughly double their ODA investments 
by the year 2015 if the MDGs are in fact to be reached by 2015. 
The security agenda and the management of crisis states: Conflict prevention, conflict management, and 
the political stabilization of weak countries are the development-related building blocks of the European 
security strategy. Here poverty reduction and the development of basic social infrastructures and security-
related institutions (police, courts, demobilization of irregular military units) are instruments that can be 
used to contain disintegration processes in developing countries that (might) present international security 
risks. To take the ESS seriously as a script for European DC means to concentrate the limited funds avail-
able mainly on the 20-30 states and societies that have already failed or are threatened with failure. Funds 
would accordingly have to be allocated on the basis of a logic different from that of the MDG project. 
The primary target group would have to consist of societies that are currently regarded as acute security 
risks, not of the neediest countries in socioeconomic terms. The main concern would thus continue to 
prevent countries from sliding into the category of failing states. The question of whether development-
related investments would best be made in Peru and Tanzania or in Iraq and Afghanistan would in this 
case have to be answered from the “security perspective”, and it would not be difficult to come up with 
cogent reasons for such a decision. 
A broadly effective strategy designed to stabilize this group of security-relevant countries would have its 
price. “State-building”, durable stabilization, “nation-building” are long-term processes that devour huge 
amounts of financial resources. The task of stabilizing a relatively small territory like Kosovo, which is 
by no means complete, has already cost the international community several billions of dollars; and major 
investments like those underway in Afghanistan are devouring even more resources ( over US $ 2.7 billion 
p.a. just for international reconstruction funds). The US attempt to “rebuild” Iraq into a stable partner for 
the West has, since early 2003, cost more than US$ 100 billion. In addition, the ESS requires new forms 
of networking between foreign policy and development policy, while the “MDG agenda” is mainly the 
responsibility of the traditional development policy actors. 
The Rio agenda and the resolution of world problems: The pressing world problems that dominated the 
1992 Rio global environmental conference and the 1990s development debates over global public goods 
have been deprived of some of their “urgency” by the threats posed by transnational terrorism as well as 
by the focus of international development agencies on the goal of halving worldwide poverty by the year 
2015 in connection with the MDGs. In the shadow of 9/11/01 it has become increasingly difficult to mo-
bilize the funds needed to control climate change and to protect global environmental goods, global envi-
ronmental systems, and biodiversity. Development policy has an important role to play in this field, for 
not one single world environmental problem can be solved without the cooperation of developing count-
ries. While there are close connections between poverty and environmental degradation, the global envi-
ronmental agenda calls for priorities and strategic conclusions that differ considerably from those implied 
by the MDG perspective. In the former case, the target group would primarily be the countries which are 
contributing to a buildup of global environmental problems and without whose involvement in trans-
boundary environmental policies no environmental turnaround is to be expected. This group of countries is 
neither identical with the group of 60 developing countries which UNDP has identified as essential part-
ners in the MDG agenda nor with the societies that are seen as important from the perspective of security 
policy dominant today. The majority of regional anchor countries have a central role to play in containing 
global environmental problems.6 The costs of an effective strategy designed to come to grips with global 
environmental problems are high. The German government's “Advisory Council on Global Environ-
mental Change” has calculated that the OECD countries would have to invest roughly 1 % of their GDP 
in global environmental policy to put an end to the growing degradation of the world ecosystem. 
                                                     
6 These include in particular Brazil, Mexico, China, India, South Africa, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, Iran, and Egypt. 
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Thanks to their economic and political importance as regional powers and new global players in world 
politics, some of these anchor countries are of crucial significance when it comes to sustainably stabiliz-
ing the international financial markets, building a global security regime, establishing worldwide rules for 
dealing with controversial technologies and further developing the international system and the UN. 
Viewed in terms of the logic of the Rio agenda as well as of other global challenges, development policy 
would have to work closely together with other sector ministries (such as ministries for the environment, 
science, research, and finances) to develop effective programs for cooperation with the anchor countries. 
Viewed against the background of the major projects outlined above, the question now is what strategic 
options will European development policy base its future action on. 
1. The path of continuity: The bilateral, European, and multilateral actors of development policy deny 
the existence of distribution conflicts and tensions between the three megaprojects discussed above, 
and continue to work – with limited funds available – in all three fields. This is a fairly realistic per-
spective, one that follows established routines and declines to make an issue of conflicts. However, 
strategies of this kind tend to disperse activities and resources and therefore to be less effective and 
target-oriented. 
2. The strategy of concentration: Here the actors of development policy concentrate on one or two meg-
aprojects instead of seeking to tackle all problems at once. The high priority presently accorded by 
the OECD countries to the fight against terrorism may, if nothing is done to counter its effects, imply 
neglect of other fields of international politics. This path is also risky, for poverty reduction, security, 
sustainable development, and other world problems are closely intertwined and will continue to be re-
levant problem constellations throughout the coming decades. The international community would 
therefore be ill advised to neglect these challenges if it is to avoid any undesirable boomerang effects. 
Table 2: Three megaprojects of development policy 
 The MDG agenda The security agenda The Rio agenda / world 
problems  
Primary goals  Poverty reduction  Conflict prevention or 
pacification; prevention of 
state failure; nation-
building; establishment of 
liberal state structures 
Safeguarding global col-
lective goods (e.g. the 
environment, financial 
architecture, world trade) 
Industrialized-country 
actors  
Basically, the actors of 
classic development pol-
icy  
Networked foreign, secu-
rity, and development 
policy  
Networked foreign and 
development policy plus 
specific sector policies 
(e.g. environmental, finan-
cial, trade policy) 
Priority partners / target 
groups  
LLDCs 20–30 fragile sates; central 
crisis regions  
Anchor countries and 
NICs 
Resource needs  Doubling of ODAa E.g. investments of the 
international community 
in civil reconstruction in 
Afghanistan, roughly US$ 
3.5 billion p.a. 
E.g. 1.0 % of the GDP of 
the OECD countries to 
stabilize global environ-
mental goodsb 
a Estimates of the “UN Millennium Project” (www.unmillenniumproject.org). 
b Estimates of the “Advisory Council on Global Environmental Change” (www.wbgu.de). 
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3. Strategic division of labor: Since the path of continuity and the strategy of concentration entail major 
risks, and since, at the same time, there is no real reason to assume that investments in international 
cooperation are likely to multiply soon, the question of strategic division of labor between bilateral, 
European, and multilateral development-policy actors becomes essential. While the range of activities 
provided by bilateral, European, and multilateral donors, is quite similar in many respects, the new 
challenges imply an urgent need for functionally specialized responses to the three megaprojects. 
Three questions must be answered in this connection: Which development actors have competitive 
advantages in what core areas? How can a division of labor help to develop advantages of specializa-
tion that would serve to lower costs and at the same time to increase the efficiency and effectiveness 
of development policy? How is it possible to reduce costly redundancies between the major actors of 
international development policy? 
Strategic division of labor as the first-best solution – a conceptual sketch: Without being able to furnish a 
complete answer to the questions outlined above, we can note that strategic division of labor appears to be 
the most promising option. This option is positioned along the dividing line between the relative diversity 
and the relative randomness of current European development policy on the one hand and a possible con-
centration on security-relevant issues on the other. In view of both, the current reality and the particular 
features of the three megaprojects, the following division of labor could prove to be a reasonable approach 
to lowering transaction costs, enhancing the supply strengths of various donors, and improving the effecti-
veness of international DC: 
• A future priority of European DC: The use of development-policy measures to contain international 
crisis flash points is an approach that would overburden the capacities of the individual member  
states. The EU's development policy should therefore gradually be brought into line with the Solana 
strategy. The experiences that have been made with concurrent activities of a large number of bi- and 
multilateral actors in Afghanistan or in the Balkans provide support for this thesis. The EU leadership 
role for the EU favored by the present paper would in no way rule out an integration and mobilization 
of member-state experiences in specific crisis regions (e.g. France in parts of Africa).  
• Core tasks of the multilateral system of development cooperation: The major multilateral organiza- 
tions – above all the World Bank, UNDP, and the regional development banks – should gear their ac-
tivities to the MDG agenda and seek to expand their specialization advantages in this field. Bilateral 
organizations involved in technical and financial cooperation could assume the following functions in 
connection with the MDG agenda: a) involvement in tendering procedures for multilateral programs 
(strengthening of competition); b) complementary bilateral contributions to multilateral programs 
(more coherence); c) sectoral leadership of bilateral organizations in multilaterally coordinated pro-
grams, assuming that bilateral actors have relevant supply strengths (orientation to competitive ad-
vantages). In view of the weaknesses displayed by some multilateral organizations in operational de-
velopment cooperation, it would be important that an orientation of this kind be accompanied by tar-
geted structural reforms of the multilateral aid agencies. This would be a challenge to be dealt with by 
the stakeholders of the international organizations (i.e. governments). 
• The orientation of bilateral DC: The bilateral cooperation provided by the EU member states should 
seek to strengthen MDG activities, above all by stepping up their financial transfers to multilateral 
organizations, by adopting active strategies to gain influence on the further development of these ac-
tivities, and by providing complementary contributions to multilaterally coordinated programs – in 
particular in cases where it is possible for bilateral cooperation to combine its specific regional exper-
tise with core sector competences. In view of a situation marked by a scarcity of funds, it would make 
little sense for individual donor countries to operate, on top of multilateral programs, an unfocused 
“bunch” of low-budget national activities in “MDG countries”. Moreover, the core field of bilateral 
development policy might in the future come to be seen in cooperation with anchor countries, without 
whose involvement crucial world problems are bound to remain unsolved. While a European coordi-
nation and focusing of activities and cooperation with other international actors is essential here to ef-
fectively tackle global environmental problems and other world problems, bilateral cooperation with 
anchor countries would be in accord with the prominent role played by this country group in foreign 
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and security policy as well as in economic and technological terms. None of the larger EU countries 
will be willing to forego bilateral cooperation with these centrally important countries. 
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